Market approval processes for new types of spinal devices: challenges and recommendations for improvement by unknown
HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT & TRANSFER
Market approval processes for new types of spinal devices:
challenges and recommendations for improvement
Arno Bisschop1 • Maurits W. van Tulder2
Received: 11 September 2015 / Revised: 4 May 2016 / Accepted: 5 May 2016 / Published online: 27 May 2016
 The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract
Background Spinal pathology and related symptoms are
among the most common health problems and are associ-
ated with high health care costs and productivity losses.
Due to the aging population, these costs are further
increasing every year. Another important reason for the
increasing costs is the market approval of new technolo-
gies, such as spinal devices that are usually more expensive
than the existing technologies. Previous cases of medical
device failure led to concern about possible deficiencies in
the market approval process.
Objective The objective is to provide an overview of U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation regarding
spinal implants to delineate the challenges and opportuni-
ties that spine surgery currently faces.
Methods In this paper, two cases of market entries of
spinal devices are presented and evaluated to illustrate
these deficiencies.
Results Spinal implant regulation is facing several chal-
lenges. New spinal devices should increase patient out-
comes and safety at reasonable societal costs. The main
challenge is to have a rigorous evaluation before dissemi-
nation, while still leaving room for innovative behavior
that thrusts the healthcare practice forward.
Conclusion We have provided recommendations to
enhance spinal implant regulation and improve and ensure
the patient’s safety and the future of spine surgery.
Keywords Spinal devices  Market approval
Introduction
Spinal pathology and related back and neck symptoms are
among the most common health problems and number one
with respect to years lived with disability [1]. Care for
individuals with spinal pathology and related symptoms are
associated with high health care costs and productivity
losses [2] and, compared to those without, cost an addi-
tional 86 billion dollars in the United States in 2005 [3].
Due to the aging population, these costs are further
increasing every year. Another important reason for the
increasing costs is the market approval of new and
expensive technologies, such as spinal implants. However,
in the USA and Canada, 88 % of orthopedic surgeons
believe that new orthopedic technologies are overpriced
and add little value in terms of patient outcomes [4].
It is important to safeguard patients’ and societal inter-
ests. The chances of success increase when physicians and
policy-makers adhere to the principles of evidence-based
medicine (EBM) and Health Technology Assessment
(HTA). EBM is the process of integrating scientific evi-
dence with clinical expertise and patients’ preferences and
expectations to optimize clinical care [5]. HTA is a multi-
disciplinary field of policy-analysis that examines the
medical, economic, social and ethical implications of the
incremental value, diffusion and use of a medical tech-
nology in health care (http://www.inahta.org). Both EBM
and HTA offer rigorous frameworks in evaluating medical
& Maurits W. van Tulder
maurits.van.tulder@vu.nl
1 Department of Orthopedic Surgery, VU University Medical
Center, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2 Department of Health Sciences, Faculty of Earth and Life
Sciences, VU University, De Boelelaan 1085,
1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
123
Eur Spine J (2016) 25:2993–3003
DOI 10.1007/s00586-016-4606-1
technologies and health care interventions for possible
market approval.
Previous cases of medical device failure led to concern
about possible deficiencies in the market approval process.
Recently, spinal surgical practice was struck by a widely
recognized scandal involving the use of rhBMP [6–9].
Such deficiencies may lead to avoidable patient harm.
Here we focus on the procedural justification of new
techniques in spinal surgery. We believe that regulatory
mechanisms must become more rigorous. Our goal is to
provide an overview of U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) regulation regarding spinal implants to delineate the
challenges and opportunities that spine surgery currently
faces. To do so, two cases, including the X-Stop (Med-
tronic Inc., Minneapolis, MN, USA) and the Dynesys
(Zimmer Inc., Warsaw, IN, USA) are presented. We con-
clude with recommendations for improving regulatory
processes.
Methods
A literature study was conducted. First, the FDA websites
were visited. Regulations, protocols and guidelines on
medical devices (including spinal implants) and specific
documents on the X-Stop and Dynesys were retrieved.
Secondly, randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and cost-
effectiveness studies of the X-Stop and Dynesys were
gathered in PubMed, Embase and the Cochrane Database.
Abstracts were assessed to select randomized controlled
trials (RCTs), economic evaluations and review articles.
All other studies including in vitro biomechanical studies,
in vivo biomechanical studies, finite element studies,
imaging studies, meeting notes, expert opinions, technical
notes and articles responses were excluded. Furthermore,
non-English language literature concerning these devices
was not discussed in this study. Published reviews were
used to cross-check all available references to find possible
missing RCTs or economic evaluations. No additional lit-
erature was found.
Results
FDA market approval processes
To be able to notice deficiencies, it is necessary to briefly
introduce the conventional FDA processes that lead to
market approval of a spinal implant.
The FDA oversees medical devices and is responsible
for the protection and promotion of public health by
regulating the marketing of devices such that only those
with demonstrated reasonable assurance of safety and
effectiveness are marketed [10]. Medical devices are cat-
egorized into three Classes. Class I devices are deemed to
be low risk and are subject to the least regulatory controls.
Class II devices are higher risk devices than Class I and
require stricter regulatory controls to provide reasonable
assurance of the device’s safety and effectiveness. Class III
devices are the highest risk devices and are subject to the
highest level of regulatory control, because they pose a
significant risk of illness or injury to a patient. Here, we
focus on class II and III devices, since nearly all spinal
implants fall under these regulations [10].
A Class II device, typically requiring 510(k) clearance,
cannot be commercially distributed until the FDA
acknowledges that the device is ‘substantially equivalent’
to a previously approved device. A 510(k) pathway is by
far the most common track for market entry [11]. For a
510(k), the FDA often relies upon well-designed bench
and/or animal testing rather than clinical studies, unless
there is a specific rationale for requesting clinical infor-
mation to support a determination of substantial equiva-
lence. However, the FDA may recommend a supporting
clinical study if there are new indications for use.
Class III devices require premarket approval (PMA). The
PMA process is more extensive and complicated and
includes the submission of clinical data to support claims
made for the device. A PMA will only be granted on the
basis of substantial pre-clinical and clinical data from
research conducted under an investigational device exemp-
tion [12]. This allows the investigational device to be used in
a clinical study to collect the necessary safety and effec-
tiveness data. The clinical studies submitted to support PMA
applications should be designed and conducted in a manner
that provides valid scientific evidence. When developing a
trial to demonstrate safety and effectiveness for spinal sys-
tems, FDA recommends a multi-center, randomized con-
trolled trial. There are no specific requirements for types of
control groups, but guidance is often provided to sponsoring
companies. The FDA recommends a 5- to 10-year follow-up
period (http://www.fda.gov).
Finally, a device will be recommended for approval by
an FDA advisory panel if the panel judges that benefits
outweigh the risks. The panel also holds the right to
demand additional data, before recommending approval.
The FDA might decide to grant approval of a device with a
requirement for additional post-approval study. In practice,
only a limited number of companies are enforced to present
post-market study requirements. The FDA also has the
legal right to perform post-market surveillance and to recall
medical devices if they are judged to jeopardize patient
safety. Although these regulatory mechanisms seem sound,
still, medical devices granted with a 510(k) or PMA that
are distributed to the market may sometimes fail within
years.
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Case studies
Manufacturers generally claim that their new techniques
contain features that are superior to standard care. Two
recently developed techniques were the X-Stop (Class III;
PMA) and the Dynesys [Class II; 510(k)]. These implants
are used to illustrate regulatory processes for new spinal
devices. A reconstruction of events is provided to empha-
size market approval deficiencies. Note that similar defi-
ciencies may also apply to market approval processes of
other new techniques.
The X-Stop
According to the FDA, the X-Stop is designed to limit
extension of the spine in the affected area, which may
relieve the symptoms of lumbar spinal stenosis. Compared
to the surgical standard, the X-Stop claims to be less
invasive, thereby reducing surgical trauma. The first FDA
filing date of the X-Stop was on the 6th of January 2004.
Before final approval, the initial protocol was amended on
April 1st, May 20th, August 2nd and December 27th, 2004,
and on June 22nd and November 14th, 2005. The X-Stop
was finally granted approval with a PMA for clinical use on
the 21st of November 2005.
A total of 167 publications were identified for the
X-Stop. Prior to its PMA, only five studies on the X-Stop
 were published. These included a prospective random-
ized multi-center study (191 patients) [13], a study on
preliminary experiences in ten patients only [14] and three
in vitro studies [15–17]. Up to now a total of ten RCTs [13,
18–25] and three cost-effectiveness studies [26–28] were
published.
The first study by Zucherman et al. was a multi-center
RCT in which the X-Stop (100 patients) was compared
with non-operative treatment (91 patients) for lumbar
spinal stenosis [13, 21]. The authors concluded that the
X-Stop offers a significant improvement in The Zurich
Claudication Questionnaire over non-operative treatment
after 1-year and 2-year follow-up [13, 21] and in improving
quality of life [20]. Furthermore, the authors stated that, at
1-year and 2-year follow-up, results were similar to pub-
lished reports on decompressive laminectomy, with con-
siderably lower morbidity [13, 21]. However, the X-Stop
was only compared with non-operative treatment in this
trial and the conclusion regarding similarity to decom-
pressive surgery was not supported by a direct comparison
with the current surgical standard.
Anderson et al. concluded in a small RCT (42 patients)
that the X-Stop was more effective after 2-year follow-up
than non-operative treatment (33 patients) for the man-
agement of symptoms secondary to degenerative lumbar
spondylolisthesis [19]. An RCT by Miller et al. compared
the X-Stop (86 patients) with a novel interspinous tech-
nique, the Superion (80 patients) (Vertiflex Inc., San
Clemente, CA, USA) [18]. This new technique was found
to be similar to the X-Stop for treating lumbar stenosis.
Again, no comparison with the current surgical standard
was provided. Finally, the most recent RCT by Stromquist
et al. reported no statistically significant difference
between decompressive surgery (50 patients) and implan-
tation of the X-Stop (50 patients) after 2-year follow-up
[22]. However, they found a significantly higher re-oper-
ation rate compared to non-instrumented surgery, as was,
among others, also reported by Verhoof in 2008 [29] and
Deyo in 2013 [30].
Patel et al. published two separate RCTs [23, 24]. In
2014 the X-Stop, being a FDA-approved interspinous
spacer, was used as a control for the Superion device. The
authors included 250 patients at baseline. Finally, after
2 years 192 patients (77 %) were analyzed. In 2015, a
similar comparison was made. However, the number of
included patients was substantially larger (N = 391). The
latter study was part of an FDA Investigational Device
Exemption (IDE) pivotal trial. In both trials, The Zurich
Claudication Questionnaire scores significantly improved
for both types of surgical care compared to conservative
care. The rates of complications and reoperations were
similar between groups.
Lønne et al. published the most recent RCT regarding
the X-Stop in the beginning of 2015 [25]. The investi-
gators compared the X-Stop with minimally invasive
decompression. The study was terminated after a midway
interim analysis because of significantly higher reoperation
rate in the X-Stop group (33 %). Besides Stromquist’s
RCT, the trial by Lønne is the only one that compared the
X-Stop with a form of standard surgical care.
Three studies were identified evaluating the cost-effec-
tiveness of the X-Stop. Skidmore et al. focused primarily
on cost-effectiveness alongside a RCT (sponsored by
Medtronic Inc.) comparing the X-Stop with conservative
care and laminectomy [27]. The authors used clinical
outcomes, quality-of-life and economic data. They found
that the X-Stop yielded favorable cost-effectiveness ratios
over both conservative care and decompressive laminec-
tomy. However, the economic evaluation was based on a
small study sample and the authors did not report the
uncertainty of their incremental cost-effectiveness ratios. In
contrast, Burnett et al. compared similar treatment options
in a review study and found that laminectomy appears to be
the most cost-effective treatment strategy for patients with
symptomatic lumbar spinal stenosis [26]. Finally, Lønne
et al. [28] found that there was a 50 % likelihood that
X-Stop is cost-effective over minimally invasive decom-
pression. The significantly higher cost of X-Stop was
ascribed to implant cost and significantly higher
Eur Spine J (2016) 25:2993–3003 2995
123
reoperation rates. However, as stated above the study was
terminated after a midway interim analysis because of
significantly higher reoperation rate in the X-Stop group
(33 %).
Deficiencies in the approval process of the X-Stop
Zucherman et al. compared implantation of the X-Stop
with conservative treatment [13, 21]. Based on this study
the FDA granted approval to the X-Stop with a PMA.
Such a decision can be considered incomplete, since the
X-Stop was not compared with standard decompressive
surgery. Superiority of conventional decompressive sur-
gery over non-operative care was previously established in
many studies [31]. Therefore, it would be erroneous to
infer that X-Stop is equivalent to decompressive surgery,
that is not what could be concluded on the basis of the
original study by Zucherman et al. [13, 21]. Basically, it
might be argued whether the scientific basis provided
enough justification to build a PMA upon.
After PMA approval, nine additional RCTs were
published comparing the X-Stop with alternatively
decompressive surgery, other instruments and non-oper-
ative treatment strategies [13, 18–25]. The RCTs of
Stromquist’s and Lønne were the only studies that
compared the X-Stop with decompressive surgery, the
standard surgical procedure. As stated, no statistically
significant difference between decompressive surgery and
implantation of the X-Stop was found on clinical out-
comes, but the X-Stop showed a significantly higher re-
operation rate compared to non-instrumented surgery [22,
25]. Interestingly enough, in some studies the X-Stop
was even used as a control as part of a FDA-IDE study
[23, 24].
In addition, it was striking that up to 2012 all RCTs,
with exception of the trial by Anderson [19] came from the
same research group. Furthermore, one or more of the
author(s) received benefits for personal or professional use
from a commercial party related directly or indirectly to the
subject of the study: e.g., royalties, stocks, stock options,
decision-making position [21]. It is well known that
industry-sponsored research is generally more favorable
over independent research [32].
Finally, the approval was contingent upon post-approval
follow-up data submission for safety and efficacy at 2 and
5 years. The Condition of Approval Study (COAST), a
prospective Phase IV 5-year post-approval study of the
X-Stop device was completed in 2012, but these results
have not been published. Currently, the X-Stop is still
PMA approved although post-market surveillance and
post-market studies have clearly contradicted the findings
of the first study by Zucherman et al. and recommendations
seem unfavorable due to a lack of long-term follow-up,
regarding efficacy and adverse effects.1 On the other hand,
none of the studies cited actually contradict the finding that
the X-Stop produced greater symptom relief than con-
servative care. It could still be argued that the X-Stop
may have a role in elderly high-risk patients for whom
symptom relief is sought and decompression surgery could
be seen as risky intervention. For this population, long-
term results may also have a different type of impor-
tance. It may be a situation where patients need to be well
informed about multiple treatment options, and engaged in
the decision-making. However, as stated the FDA may
recommend a supporting clinical study if there are new
indications for use, this has not been executed for this
possible new indication and corresponding target-popula-
tion of the X-Stop.
The Dynesys
The FDA indicates that the Dynesys (Zimmer Inc.,
Warsaw, IN, USA) is intended to provide immobilization
and stabilization of spinal segments as an adjunct to fusion
in the treatment of and following acute and chronic insta-
bilities or deformities and failed previous fusion. The
claimed advantage of the Dynesys is its motion preser-
vation capacity and its ability to prevent adjacent segment
degeneration [33]. Because fusion is not the end-point, no
bone grafts are used, offering less invasive surgery and less
surgical trauma. In March 2004, the Dynesys received a
510(k) market approval, since it was considered to be
‘substantially equivalent’ to the Silhouette spinal fixation
system (also Zimmer Inc., Warsaw, IN, USA). The
Dynesys as a stand-alone device for non-fusion stabi-
lization was later recognized by the FDA as a new type of
treatment, and consequently Zimmer had to apply for a
PMA. On the 4th of November 2009, the PMA application
for this device was rejected.2 Withdrawal from the market
might be argued being a success of the FDA, albeit
delayed. Although a comprehensive review executed by the
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) of the
National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom in
2009 based on available data found that the Dynesys is
both safe and efficacious as a dynamic stabilization tech-
nique for some patients with intractable lumbar pain,3 the
gold standard for disc and facet joint degeneration with
symptomatic instability still remains a rigid fusion technique








2996 Eur Spine J (2016) 25:2993–3003
123
used dynamic stabilization system, although now used in the
USA in patients with an ‘off-label’ indication only.
A total of 154 publications were identified for the
Dynesys. The approved 510(k) for the Dynesys in
March 2004 consisted of a review [36], a single prospec-
tive, non-randomized, non-controlled multi-center study
(83 patients) [37] and an in vitro study [38]. None of these
studies were performed primarily in the USA, which is one
of the FDA’s requirements.
Post-approval, one RCT by Yu et al. was published
which included a total of 53 patients, allocated to a pos-
terior lumbar interbody fusion (26 patients) or Dynesys
(27 patients) [39]. Patients in both groups clinically
improved, but no statistically significant differences
between groups were found after 3-year follow-up. Com-
plications were similar between groups. In addition, in
2007 1-year preliminary results as a part of a multicenter
randomized FDA-IDE clinical trial including a number of
101 patients were published [40]. However, this study had
a non-comparative design. To our knowledge, no data on
cost-effectiveness of the Dynesys has been published.
Deficiencies in the approval process of the Dynesys
It might be argued, considering the assumed equivalence of
this device to the Silhouette, that surgeons and the man-
ufacturer were not specifically interested in publishing data
on indications and patient selection criteria for the
Dynesys. However, from a clinical point of view, the
Dynesys is no ordinary posterior instrumentation tech-
nique because of the dynamic component of it.
The limited amount of published research before the
Dynesys was granted 510(k) clearance is especially dis-
appointing because the Dynesys was introduced on the
European market in 1999. Over 40,000 patients have been
implanted with this device since then [41], but with little
published research. Thus, physicians did not report their
clinical outcomes, even though the Dynesys was new and
its safety and efficacy had not yet been demonstrated.
The Dynesys received its 510(k) approval long before
the first and sole RCT was published [39]. Although this
device has been in clinical use for more than a decade,
there was insufficient evidence in the period between the
510(k) approval and the rejected PMA application to
determine whether this device resulted in improved health
outcomes compared to standard treatments. Although
short-term clinical results seemed favorable, long-term
complications arose, including screw loosening, late
infections and adjacent segment degeneration [42–44]. It
appears that these complications were not recognized and
specifically addressed until 2005 [45]. Thus, this was an
example of a new technique that was widely used without
the results being scientifically scrutinized.
As stated, Yu et al. found no significant differences
between the Dynesys and the surgical standard in terms of
clinical outcomes [39]. If a new technique is proven to be
non-inferior, then it should be proven to be safer and or
more cost-effective, otherwise, no additional value is cre-
ated. Cost-effectiveness of the Dynesys was not only not
confirmed, it was not even investigated.
Finally it is important to note that a 510(k) pathway
instead of a PMA procedure was chosen. The Dynesys
was considered to be of substantial equivalence, while
basically, this should have been regarded as a new dynamic
stabilization technique instead of a new type of posterior
technique.
Discussion
New techniques should be as safe, effective and cost-ef-
fective as possible to optimize healthcare. Optimizing
patient care should be the primary purpose of market
approval of new spinal implants. The presented cases
briefly introduced deficiencies in the PMA and
510(k) market approval processes. This study provides a
comprehensive overview of available literature and
reconstruction of events concerning the period before and
after the market entry of the X-Stop and Dynesys.
Challenges in market approval processes of spinal
devices
To optimize patient care, manufacturers, policy-makers
and last but not least, physicians need to change their
current practice. Long-term safety and effectiveness data
should be required before physicians start working rou-
tinely with a new technique. Not only are spinal surgeons
directly involved in patient care, they also are vital for the
accessibility of clinical data. Physicians should aim on
reviewing every patient with a new product to define its
success or failure. Still just a fraction of clinical outcomes
and adverse events is reported.
To successfully apply for a PMA, one successful trial is
sufficient to receive marketing approval. In case of a
510(k), requirements are even less substantial. In relatively
small trials, not all potential adverse effects are found.
Within the framework of EBM, the highest level of evi-
dence for effectiveness is a systematic review or a meta-
analysis of multiple RCTs [5]. A single RCT is usually not
considered as sufficient prove for effectiveness of a clinical
intervention, especially not when the sample size is small,
potential risk of bias high and/or the study authors have a
conflict of interest. In surgical studies in which patients,
care providers and outcome assessors are not blinded risk
of bias is always present. Replication of results in another
Eur Spine J (2016) 25:2993–3003 2997
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RCT performed by another research group (preferably
without any conflict of interest) is required. Within the
FDA, this philosophy is not adopted. Interestingly enough,
an FDA drug approval does typically require two RCTs.
One could argue that device approval should simply
require similar standards.
In light of HTA, economic evaluations in the field of
orthopedic surgery are direly needed to facilitate well-in-
formed policy decisions. These studies entail systematic
comparisons of two or more health technologies, services
or programs in terms of both costs and consequences [2].
The best comparator for new technologies is usual care, in
case of orthopedic surgery the standard surgical technique
for the same indication. Simultaneous comparison of the
costs and consequences provides insight into whether the
new intervention is worth doing over the standard tech-
nique or whether the additional costs of a new intervention
are worth the effects. If an intervention is more effective
than another intervention but associated with higher costs,
the intervention may still be cost-effective [2]. Of course,
economic evaluations are only useful if they are based on
valid, reliable and precise effectiveness data. In view of
increasing health care expenses [3], it is of utmost impor-
tance to provide high-quality healthcare for an affordable
prize. Regulatory processes are a key element in limiting
these costs. It was striking that no data on cost-effective-
ness for the Dynesys were available, while only two
studies with conflicting results were published for the
X-Stop [26, 27]. From a cost-effectiveness point of view,
these new devices might not have been approved. In
addition, not only are physicians and policy-makers
obliged to provide the best clinical care possible, they
should also protect the availability of healthcare resources
by addressing the economic perspective.
The main target for a physician should not be a weak
demonstration of ‘substantial equivalence’ of a new, more
expensive device compared to a previously approved
device. It should be improving patient safety and effec-
tiveness. However, manufacturers often use the
510(k) pathway [11]. Yearly, the FDA evaluates thousands
of new medical devices. Of all applications, 99 % are
cleared via the 510(k) process, directly leading to insuffi-
cient evidence of the safety and clinical superiority at the
time of dissemination in clinical practice.
From a scientific point of view it has been argued that
the FDA is generally too quick to approve new devices
[46]. On the other hand, public opinion often demands
quick approval of new and promising techniques, making it
a politically challenging issue. The FDA also functions
within a legal framework, affecting (and limiting) its
decision-making. For example the FDA is forbidden by law
to consider the cost of drugs and devices. In other words,
the FDA is legally prevented tot consider cost-
effectiveness in their approval deliberations. Only by an
amendment, cost-effectiveness can be put on the FDA’s
agenda, basically making it a political issue again.
Compared to other countries, the FDA is considered one
of the most stringent authorities when it comes to approval
of medical devices.4 In addition, the USA market is the
single largest market for medical devices and is widely
acknowledged as leading in device approval, accounting
for 38 % of the total market share.5 Ideally, other countries
should argue the clinical outcomes of medical devices
approved by the FDA by generating their own high-quality
scientific data. The higher the standards of approval in
these countries, the more likely developers/manufacturers
are pressured into more rigorous studies.
Recommendations for market approval processes
of spinal devices
We believe that every new type of spinal implant should be
evaluated in at least one RCT. It should not be compared
with non-operative treatment but with the standard surgical
technique. RCTs should take place in a multi-center setup
to limit bias. In addition, a multi-center setup may reduce
potential conflicts of interest and increase sample size [47,
48]. After obtaining successful results in a first trial, a
second confirmatory trial should be performed by another
group before a new device is approved for clinical use and
widely disseminated. Furthermore, to address adverse
events and long-term results, follow-up is key. We rec-
ommend that follow-up through clinical registries should
be obligatory for at least 5 years after initial approval.
Although it has a restrictive outcome on clinical practice,
we believe that off-label use should always be included in
studies, since evidence only applies for the investigated and
approved indications. Publishing off-label use will finally
support patient care. In case a medical device is frequently
used for a new indication or subgroup, then a new RCT
needs to be performed. In a situation regarding an
exemption, good clinical practice and corresponding case-
reports suffices. Furthermore, in concordance with the
AllTrials Initiative (http://www.alltrials.net), all clinical
trial protocols of ongoing and future studies should be
registered in the clinical trial database (http://www.clin
icaltrials.gov). To this end, other research groups are able
to see which trials are ongoing and therefore no unneces-
sary harm is done to patients due to an overkill of similar
trials. Finally, all data resulting from registered clinical
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However, we acknowledge that the costs to perform a
large and long-term trial are substantial. As stated, the FDA
requires a 5- to 10-year follow-up period. For example, the
market entry and clinical study of the Barricaid (Intrinsic
Therapeutics GmbH, Du¨sseldorf, Germany), a spinal
implant to prevent recurring herniation after discectomy,
cost over tens of millions of dollars.6 Recently, Paradigm
Spine GmbH (New York City, NY, USA), the producer of
the Coflex (an interlaminar stabilization device),
announced a 75 million dollar secured debt financing.7
Obviously, these costs will eventually be discounted in the
price of the implant when it is introduced on the market,
directly increasing healthcare expenses. However, it also
shows how high stakes are. Another disadvantage of the
high costs of these trials is that they limit innovation. Small
innovative enterprises will only reach the point of market
entry when being funded or acquired by large (orthopedic)
enterprises. The latter possibly decreases market competi-
tion which might further increases the price per implant. In
other words, an optimum should be sought in which patient
safety is guaranteed while at the same time innovative
behavior flourishes.
As stated, new techniques are often more expensive,
without being superior to the clinical standard [4]. New
devices, if they are more expensive than standard surgical
techniques, should be clinically superior. Approving new
devices that are equally effective but more expensive will
only increase costs but not improve quality of health care.
To serve not only a patient’s interest but also the interest of
society, we recommend that every 510(k) and PMA should
be based on valid, reliable and precise effectiveness as well
as cost-effectiveness analysis. The latter should, similar to
data on effectiveness, be obligatorily made available.
Manufacturers prefer a 510(k) instead of a PMA due to
its less extensive procedures. In a 510(k) procedure man-
ufacturers claim that their new device is of substantial
equivalence to a previously approved device. For new
implants that are in line with comparable devices, it is
reasonable to use the 510(k) approach. However, we
believe that new techniques should not easily be considered
to be of ‘substantial equivalence’. In other words, new
techniques should ideally more often be reviewed by PMA
regulations. Considering the risk classification, we believe
that in case of a Class III device, the FDA could use the
GRADE System to evaluate the level of clinical evidence
for new techniques [49]. The GRADE system has been
adopted by national and international professional medical
societies, health-related branches of government and health
care regulatory bodies in most US academic medical cen-
ters [50].
Our recommendations are illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows the Market approval process for a class II
device requiring 510(k) clearance, while Fig. 2 focuses on
a class III device requiring pre-market approval (PMA)
clearance (based on: Dawnbreaker Medical Portal, April
2013).
Medicinal regulation could provide guidance for the
regulatory processes of spinal implants. In many countries,
regulations for new pharmaceutical interventions are strict,
but none exist for medical devices or non-pharmaceutical
interventions [2]. In many countries new drugs are only
reimbursed in public health insurance systems if they are
proven to be safe, effective, and cost-effective compared to
existing drugs for the same disease or disorder [2]. The
mission of FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research (CDER) is to ensure that drugs marketed in this
country are safe and effective. To introduce a new drug
product into the USA market, a company needs to submit a
new drug application (NDA). It is the responsibility of the
company seeking to market a drug to test it and submit
evidence that it is safe and effective. A team of CDER
physicians, statisticians, chemists, pharmacologists, and
other scientists reviews the sponsor’s NDA containing the
data. After obtaining promising data from laboratory
studies, submission of an Investigational New Drug (IND)
application to CDER is the first step. Once the IND
application is in effect, the drug sponsor could begin their
clinical trials. Clinical trials are experiments that use
human subjects to see whether a drug is effective, and what
side effects it may cause. The FDA provides regulations
and guidelines that the clinical investigators must have
used to conduct a successful study, and that protect their
human subjects. After a sponsor (often a company) submits
an IND application, it must wait 30 days before starting a
clinical trial to allow FDA time to review the prospective
study. If FDA finds a problem, it can order a ‘clinical hold’
to delay an investigation, or interrupt a clinical trial if
problems occur during the study. When an IND application
is successful, a company is allowed to start a clinical trial.
A pharmaceutical clinical trial consists of four phases.
During the first phase, healthy human subjects are inclu-
ded. The main goal of this phase is to determine dosages
and whether the drug is safe to use. In the second phase,
drugs are tested on patients to assess early efficacy and
safety. The final step before market approval is the third
phase. During this phase, efficacy and safety is tested in a
large group of patients, preferably in a double-blinded
randomized controlled trial comparing the investigational
product with the current standard. After market approval,
phase four is used to evaluate the medicinal product when
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patients, i.e., post-marketing surveillance. After the spon-
sor has analyzed the clinical trials data and concluded that
enough evidence existed on the drug’s safety and effec-
tiveness to meet FDA’s requirements for marketing
approval, the sponsor submits an NDA with full informa-
tion on manufacturing specifications, stability and
bioavailability data, method of analysis of each of the
dosage forms the sponsor intends to market, packaging and
labeling for both physician and consumer.
This short description of pharmaceutical regulations for
new drug development shows a striking difference with
medical device regulation. The differences between market
authorization approval of spinal implants and medicinal
products are substantial. However, obviously these trials
cannot be fully copied to spinal implant regulation. Still,
we believe that the ‘pharmaceutical mindset’ can and will
lead to improved regulatory processes for spinal devices.
Conclusions
In conclusion, spinal implant regulation is facing several
challenges. Previously marketed implants taught us valu-
able lessons. New spinal devices should increase patient
outcomes and safety at reasonable societal costs. The main
challenge is to have a rigorous evaluation before dissemi-
nation, while still leaving room for innovative behavior
that thrusts the healthcare practice forward. We have pro-
vided recommendations to enhance spinal implant regula-
tion and improve and ensure the patient’s safety and the
Fig. 1 Market approval process for a class II device requiring 510(k) clearance
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future of spine surgery. We do not suggest that the FDA
should be required to prove efficacy over the long-term.
Such a situation will not be realistic as these resources are
not available at the FDA. The role of the FDA should be
assessing whether there is sufficient evidence for the effi-
cacy and cost-effectiveness for new interventions. Appli-
cants (developers or manufacturers) should be responsible
for providing adequate and sufficient data to facilitate the
FDA in making a decision about market approval.
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